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European Regionalism in Copmparative Perspective: 
Features and Limits of the new Medievalism Approach to World Order 
 
Sergio Fabbrini
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Introduction 
 
Several interpretations (or paradigms) have been elaborated for understanding the post-Cold War 
developments of the international system. Two in particular deserve to be considered. On the one 
hand, the ‘new’ regionalism interpretation (very influential in the 1990s) has hearkened back to 
Hedley Bull’s analysis (Bull 1995) of a ‘New Medievalism’ to replace the existing system of states 
(Gamble 2001; 1993). The European Union (EU) and other experiences of regional integration such 
as the Association of Southern Asian Nations (ASEAN), the Asian Pacific Economic Cooperation 
(APEC),  the  Mercado  Comun  del  Sur  (MERCOSUR)  and  the  North  American  Free  Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA) have been interpreted as new forms of international power in company with a 
panoply of different types of inter-governmental organizations.  
        Their very existence has strengthened claims that the Westphalian system of states is being 
supplanted by a fragmented post-Westphalian order with no clear locus of power.  On the other 
hand, the ‘empire’ interpretation (very influential in the first half of the 2000s) has hearkened back 
to the old view of a homogeneous world controlled by only one country (Ferguson 2003), in this 
case the only super-power remained in town after the collapse of the Soviet bloc, the United States 
(US). In many regards, the two interpretations have competed for establishing the predominant 
paradigm not only within the disciplines of international studies but also in the larger attentive 
public. The first has advanced the rationale of a post-modern understanding of the world, the second 
has re-affirmed the hard reality of modernity.  International developments of the 2000s have brought 
the empire paradigm to its end. However, it is the aim of this paper to show that also the other 
paradigm is much below its interpretative ambitions. 
 
Between Empire and New Medievalism 
 
The empire paradigm has been based on the very realistic assumption of the unipolar nature of the 
international system emerged from the end of the Cold War. In the new unipolar system, it seemed 
that  the  US  could  shape  the  world  with  its  interests  and  values.  Especially  with  the  arrival  to 
governmental power of neo-conservative politicians (after the presidential election of 2000, the neo-
cons came to control both the presidency and the Congress), this paradigm came to be shared by 
large sectors of world public opinion, and not only by academics. Giving up the post-war politics of 
self-restraint after September 11, 2001 the neo-conservative coalition tried to make unipolarity the 
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condition for building a new predominant, if not imperial, role by the US at the global level. The 
Iraq invasion in 2003, against the will of the UN Security Council, epitomized this attempt of 
creating a new international order based on the undisputed military and economic strength of the 
US. Indeed, in the neo-conservative circles, in order to justify the unilateral doctrine, (democratic) 
empire began to become part of the political discussion (Daalder and Lindsey 2003). Among the 
supporters  of  the  new  American  strategy,  there  was  an  increased  interest  in  past  imperial 
experiences and attempts to rehabilitate empire as a form of political rule and basis for international 
order (Ferguson 2003).  
          In  any  case,  a  comparative  literature  on  democratic  empires  has  flourished  in  the  2000s 
(O’Brien and Cless 2002; Mead 2007). At the same moment, the denunciation of US empire became 
very soon the leit motif of the most radical critics (Hardt and Negri 2001). For both supporters and 
critics, while previous imperial ages were characterized by a competition between empires, the post 
Cold War version was seen almost exclusively in terms of the unchallenged military and economic 
dominance of the US. The future was perceived to be either one of the end of history and geography 
(Fukuyama  1993)  or  one  of  a  battle  between  the  imperial  basis  of  globalization  and  forms  of 
localized and fundamentalist resistance (Barber 1995; O’Brien 1992). 
At the end of the 2000s, the empire metaphor appears to have lost any significant appeal. 
Certainly, there is little dispute that by a range of indicators – from military might (and spending) to 
size of the economy – the US continues to be the only existing global power (Ferguson 2005). The 
international  system  continues  to  display  an  uncontested  unipolar  feature  at  the  military  level. 
However, unipolarism has not created a world at disposal of the US. The failure of the US invasion 
of Iraq has shown that American ‘hard’ power is not sufficient not only for bringing order in the 
international system but even for settling domestic conflicts.  
Indeed,  one  might  even  argue  that  the  use  of  hard  power,  when  disconnected  from  a 
concomitant use of ‘soft’ power as it happened in Iraq (Nye 2004), has contributed to increase, 
rather  than  to  tame,  chaos  and  violence  in  the  world  (Hoffman  2006).  Moreover,  the  empire 
metaphor has failed in interpreting the domestic nature of the empire. As it has been frequent in the 
past for many critical observers of the US, the democratic nature of the latter’s domestic politics 
was  dramatically  downplayed.  And  thus  it  was  under-evaluated  the  structural  tension  between 
domestic democracy and global role of the country (Fabbrini 2008). In fact, with the success of the 
Democratic party’s candidates in the mid-term elections of 2006, and the consequent formation of a 
divided government, the US has started to tremble in its imperial attitudes. Domestic opposition to 
imperial policies has been institutionalized in the separated system of government. It is difficult to 
be externally an empire with an open political structure internally (Fabbrini 2007). In fact, in the 
US, the end of the neo-conservative era has re-opened the debate on the American role in the world 
system. The new paradigm of empire is going to be substituted by a new one.  
Can thus we argue that the paradigm on the New Medievalism has remained as the most 
compelling  for  interpreting  the  post-Cold  War  international  system?  It  is  certain  that  regional 
arrangements  and  other  inter-governmental  forms  of  global  order  have  created  a  much  more 
complex system than the one imagined by the empire paradigm which equates world power with 
military might. It is certain that this much more complex international order is the outcome of the 
transformation of the nation state which is no longer the main or only actor in the international 
arena. However, it is open to question whether the new regional organizations and the emerging 
global inter-governmental relations (Slaughter 2003) might be considered sufficient structures for 
supporting a new world order. Indeed, the New Medievalism paradigm seems to capture only one 
dimension of the world order.  
It is the aim of this paper to show such weakness. For this reason, I will proceed as follows: 
first, I will discuss the very concept of regionalism showing that it includes quite different types of 
regional  organizations,  being  the  main  difference  between  economic  and  political  regionalism. 
Second, I will discuss in some detail the EU which is the only case of political regionalism. Thus, 
third, I will compare some of the significant cases of economic regionalism (in particular ASEAN,   5   
APEC, MERCOSUR and NAFTA) for showing both their specific peculiarities and their structural 
difference with the EU. Finally, I will elaborate some critical comments on the New Medievalism 
literature,  arguing  that  it  cannot  represent  the  new  encompassing  paradigm  for  thinking  on  the 
features of the new world order. Indeed, the latter seems to combine post-modern experiences (such 
as the new regional organizations) and modern power relations, as those which require the action of 
powerful states. Certainly, the global co-existence of different organizations and logics constitutes a 
powerful constraint on powerful states. In particular the US will have to up-date its post-war model 
of hegemonic action. 
 
Regionalism as the New Medievalism  
 
Understanding  political  order  in  the  wake  of  the  end  of  the  Cold  War  and  at  the  dawn  of  an 
increasingly  global  economy  has  upset  the  parameters  of  scholarship  for  both  domestic  and 
international politics.  For scholars interested primarily in domestic politics, there is no end in sight 
to  the  debate  about  the  changing  role,  structure  and  nature  of  the  state  in  the  governing  of 
contemporary societies within the territorial boundaries of the state.  Not unrelated, international 
relations has also tried to come to grips with a world which lost its primarily structural feature – 
bipolarity – at the same time as a conjuncture of forces were creating a greater diffusion of sites, 
actors and issues at the international level.  
          The debate here has been in trying to understand whether we are still in the logic of the 
Westphalia system of states or whether this is being replaced by a new basis for political order in 
which the classic distinctions between the public and the private and between domestic and external 
politics no longer holds true (Neack 2008).  All too often, these two different explorations of the 
state have been carried out in isolation of each other as have the various scenarios examining the 
emerging  orders  such  as  the  new  regionalism  and  globalization.    In  addition,  they  have  been 
closeted into different domains of political analysis, primarily comparative politics for the domestic 
level and international relations for the global level. 
The two approaches to the role of the state share a concern with the continuing utility of the 
constitutive elements of the modern state: sovereignty, territory and political community. Many 
scholars (Krasner 1999) have begun to argue that sovereignty is no longer able to capture the nature 
of  contemporary  politics,  domestic  or  international,  as  it  has  been  thrown  into  question  by 
globalization. We have jumped from an international to a global order; that is, we no longer have 
national economies contained and defined by the territorial boundaries and political authority of the 
state but production models that are not contained within national borders.   
The collapse of the Bretton Woods system with the dollar crisis of 1973 was instrumental in 
opening the way for creating global financial markets that complemented and accelerated global 
production systems.  Notions of authority limited to the territorial boundaries of the state has created 
asymmetries  between  the  juridical  and  material  bases  of  governing  trans-national  exchanges  of 
capital, goods, workers and services. Moreover, new policy challenges emerged which called into 
questions the traditional policy autonomy of the territorial state. From global climate change to 
control of what gets broadcast on the television screens in homes throughout the world, it seemed 
evident that the territorial state, even the larger one, is not in the conditions of taking effective 
decisions for tackling those problems. Technological changes in telecommunication and information 
processing has meant that territorial boundaries may no longer be enough to define not simply 
political authority but also the nature and terms of membership in a political community (Hutton 
and Giddens 2000).   
Several and different forms of inter-governmental cooperation have emerged for dealing 
with  the  new  challenges.  As  Slaughter  (2004:  5  and  6)  argued  forcefully,  “stop  imagining  the 
international system as a system of states – unitary entities like billiard balls or black boxes – 
subject to rules created by international institutions that are apart from, ‘above’ these states. Start 
thinking about a world of governments”, that is a world of inter-governmental institutions, with   6   
“government officials within these various institutions (participating) in many different types of 
networks”. Regionalism is considered one, if not the predominant, form of the inter-governmental 
cooperation  pursued  in  different  area  of  the  world.  Certainly,  such  regionalism  is  based  on 
important differences between the nature, scope, decision-making styles, compliance mechanisms, 
structures and international status of the different regional organizations. However, these regional  
‘blocs’ have been considered the basis of a new world order.  
This regionalism was developed primarily in Europe through the formation of the European 
Union (EU) and thus adopted in Asia, South and Central America, North America and Africa (Telò 
2001).  Moreover, it was not limited geographically as some forms of regional blocs, such as APEC, 
brought together members from different continents. In some cases, closer interdependence was 
seen as a way of protecting specific development models or specific cultural patterns from the 
pressures coming from more powerful economic and cultural forces (sometimes this two coincided).  
In other cases, the new regionalism was seen as a way of resolving long-standing rivalries between 
neighbours.  Finally, the new regionalism was also a result of an imitation effect and a means of 
increasing bargaining power in international negotiations for certain parts of the world. 
The post-Cold War regionalism is different from the Cold War regionalism (Hurrell 1995). 
The latter (known also as ‘old’ regionalism) consisted in a series of alliances promoted by the US in 
Europe, South America and East Asia in order to guarantee regional security. NATO (the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization instituted in 1949 in Brussels), SEATO (the South-East Asia Treaty 
Organization instituted in 1954 in Manila) and CENTO (the Central Treaty Organization instituted 
in 1955 first in Bagdad and then in Ankara and which collapsed in 1979) are the examples of this 
US-leaded  regionalism  (the  US  joined  CENTO  in  1958,  while  it  was  the  driving  actor  for  the 
establishment of the other two treaties) (Ikenberry 2001).  
Only  in  Europe,  the  regional  organization  for  security  came  to  be  complemented  by  a 
regional  organization  for  market  integration,  with  the  creation  of  the  European  Coal  and  Steel 
Community (ECSC) in 1952 (Paris Treaty) and thus its development in the European Economic 
Community  (EEC)  and  European  Atomic  Energy  Community  (EURATOM)  in  1957  (Rome 
Treaties). It was the end of the Cold War which re-opened the road for regional experiments or for 
the strengthening and re-interpretation of the existing ones.  
The  modern  concept  of  regionalism  is  exclusively  based  on  inter-states  and  inter-
governmental  cooperation  on  economic  and  trade  issues  (Mansfield  and  Milner  2000).  Such 
cooperation is the expression of important changes which have taken place since the 1990s. First, 
they are the expression of the new economic consensus which praises exports’ promotion rather 
than imports’ substitution strategies. Developed and developing countries came thus to share the 
same vision of economic policy, a vision based on the idea that nationalization of the economic 
activities does no longer represent the recipe for a successful development.  
Second, they are the expression of the necessity to reduce the complexity of multilateral 
negotiation  in  a  liberalized  world  trade.  Negotiations  between  regions  (rather  than  between 
countries) reduce that complexity, not only through the limitation of the actors involved but also 
through a simplification of the agenda (many issues, in fact, are solved at the regional level).  
Third, they are expression of a need to protect or preserve regional peculiarities (in cultural 
and social terms) in front of what is perceived as a homogenizing globalization process. At mid-
2000s there were circa 80 regional agreements with preferential entrance to member states, although 
such agreements are generally open and not antagonistic. Indeed, 3 of the 130 members of the 
World Trade Organization (WTO) do not belong to any of the existing regional aggregations. 
In a comparative perspective, regional organizations display different models of economic 
integration,  i.e.  of  relations  between  public  authorities  and  market  forces.  In  all  the  cases  of 
regionalism, the states which participate in the agreements give up to a certain degree of autonomy 
in  specific  and  delimited  policy  realms  in  order  to  increase  their  capability  of  facing  policy 
challenges which are common to the actors of a given specific area. The rationale for building 
regional organizations has been the creation of trans-border markets able to generate economic   7   
growth through an increase of economic transactions. Transactions which were blocked by national 
barriers instituted around economic systems territorially defined.  
For many scholars, the EU is the most advanced model of an economic integration which 
has thus developed in political terms. For them, economic and political integration are the poles of a 
continuum,  in  the  sense  that  any  regional  organization  has  the  potential  to  move  along  that 
continuum. Indeed, for Slaughter (2004: 264-265), “the European Union is pioneering governance 
through government networks in its international affairs…(It is a) distinctive  form of government 
by network exportable to other regions and to the world at large”. For Marks (1997), it is the 
internal  structure  of  the  EU  which  makes  the  latter  similar  to  Carolingian  Empire,  with  its 
overlapping and differentiated jurisdictions, of the European medieval period (Marks 1997). 
  However, the new regional and inter-governmental organizations differ significantly in 
structural terms. The idea of a continuum among them is an underestimation of those systemic 
differences  (and  of  their  different  global  governance  implications).  In  fact,  there  is  a  systemic 
difference between ‘political’ and ‘economic’ regional organizations. Concerning the nature of the 
regional aggregation, such a difference is not a question of degree but of kind. Political regionalism 
substantiates  a  project  for  building  a  polity  with  a  supranational  public  authority.  Economic 
regionalism concerns projects for building a common market or a custom union organized by inter-
governmental or trans-governmental governance relations.  
Certainly,  also  among  economic  regional  organizations  there  are  important  differences 
along several dimensions (Ohmae 1998). They may be the expression of low or high economic 
integration  between  the  countries  of  that  specific  area.  They  might  reflect  different  degree  of 
symmetry  between  the  largest  and  smallest  member  states.  They  might  be  open  or  closed 
organizations, with different logics of trade exchange. Some organizations might have low trade 
barriers within and high trade barriers with the outside world, while other organizations might leave 
to the member states the possibility to pursue bilateral trade relations with the countries of the 
outside world.  
Be as it may, these economic regional organizations (as ASEAN, APEC, MERCOSUR and 
NAFTA) are not polities or political systems with an international status. They are inter-states or 
inter-governmental agreements without any supra-states or supra-national structure. Indeed, in none 
of  them  strategies  of  positive  integration  are  pursued.  Economic  regionalism  is  exclusively 
characterized by strategies of negative integration. Regional authority is utilized for dismantling 
national barriers to cross-border trade or investment and not for reducing the national externalities 
of cross-border economic activity.  
Thus,  economic  regions  pursue  market-supporting,  but  not  market-correcting,  strategies. 
Positive integration has not constituted object of treaty discussion, nor the measures associated with 
it have had the support of social and political actors as it happened historically within the nation 
states. Economic regions have split their governance relations between the trans-national market and 
the national polity. Their members have used the regional aggregation for changing their economy 
without changing their domestic institutions. 
This has not been the case of the EU political regionalism, where the supra-states features 
are as relevant as the inter-states ones. In the EU there is a supranational authority structure which 
has  supported  and  steered  significant  market-correcting  strategies.  The  EU  has  introduced  an 
autonomous  legislation  on  issues  like  health,  safety,  labour  market,  environment.  It  has  an 
agricultural welfare state (through the financial support of the prices of products) and a territorial 
welfare state (through structural funds allocated to the poorest sub-national regions). Although, 
certainly,  also  in  the  EU  social  exclusion  continues  to  be  addressed  mainly  by  member  states 
governments and legislatures.  
The EU has not decoupled public and private power, national and supranational governance 
structures. Rather, it has entangled them in new ways. One might even argue (Caporaso 1996) that, 
if Europe witnessed the birth of the territorial state between seventeenth and nineteenth centuries, it 
is  now  moving  beyond  that  form  of  power,  experimenting  with  a  new  model  of  supranational   8   
governance. Moreover, if the EU has an institutional structure independent from that of the member 
states,  this  is  not  the  case  in  the  economic  regional  organizations.  They  have  not  an  elected 
parliament,  a  powerful  commission  or  an  independent  judicial  body  for  settling  the  disputes. 
Finally,  if  the  economic  regionalisms  might  differ  for  the  type  of  the  organizational  model 
(hierarchical  in  the  case  of  NAFTA  and  MERCOSUR,  because  of  the  overwhelming  influence 
exercised respectively by the US and Brazil, horizontal instead in the case of APEC and ASEAN), 
clearly the success of any political regionalism resides in the horizontal character of its governance 
structure.  Which  is  what  happened  to  the  EU  during  its  institutionalization  (with  the  decision-
making  power  shared  by  a  plurality  of  institutions,  such  as  the  Council  of  Ministers,  the 
Commission  and  the  Parliament),  although  in  the  initial  phases  (till  the  1970s)  the  Council  of 
Ministers played a predominant role (see Table 1). It is necessary, now, to compare more in detail 
the two regionalisms. 
 
 
 
Table 1: Varieties of Regionalism 
   
Nature of Regional Integration   
  Economic  Political 
Hierarchical  NAFTA 
MERCOSUR  EU (till the 1970s) 
Organizational 
Model 
Horizontal  APEC 
ASEAN        EU (since the 1980s) 
 
 
Political regionalism: the case of the EU 
 
The institutionalization of a supranational polity 
The EU is a supranational polity that is the result of the evolution of a historic agreement 
amongst, first, Western European nation states aimed to close the long period of dramatic and 
reiterated hot wars (the First and Second World Wars) and, then, the Western and Eastern parts of 
Europe aimed to close the half-century long Cold War (Fabbrini 2007). Thus, European integration 
in the second half of the century was a response to the trauma and demons of the first half.  A 
double peace pact was established between previous enemies. Its success was dependent, on the 
security side, by the military protection of NATO and, on the economic side, by the formation and 
enlargement of a common market aimed to generate a diffuse economic growth.  It would be wrong 
to see the origins and extension of European regionalism simply as the result of economic pressures.   
The roots of the institutionalization of the EU may be found in the Treaty of Paris (1952) 
which gave birth to the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC).  It was the struggle for 
control of these primary resources that led to tensions between France and Germany for nearly a 
century.    While  there  were  other  signatories  to  the  agreement,  it  made  abundantly  clear  that 
European  integration,  in  whatever  form,  was  not  possible  without  France  and  Germany.    The 
Franco-German axis was the engine of the integration till the 1990s (Hendriks and Morgan 2001). 
The Treaties of Rome (1957) followed that in Paris and included the agreement that created the 
European Economic Community (EEC).  The process that led to a common market would lead to 
the creation of the single market with the Single European Act (SEA) in 1986 and its provisions for   9   
the completion of the single market by the end of 1992.  The SEA celebrated the four freedoms that 
defined the single market: freedom of movement for goods, services, capital and persons. In order to 
reach this objective, decisional rules were changed from unanimity to qualified majority voting for 
matters related to the single market. 
The effects of the SEA were felt almost immediately with the signing of the Treaty on 
European Union (TEU, or also known as the Maastricht treaty) on 7 February 1992.  The TEU was 
important for three reasons.  First, it gave rise to the aim of economic and monetary union (EMU) 
which led to the single currency in 1999 and its circulation in 2002 (Martin and Ross 2004). Second, 
it introduced the notion of European citizenship that was distinct from national citizenship in that it 
connoted particular rights.  Third, it increased the organizational complexity and responsibilities of 
European  institutions  by  dividing  them  into  the  three  ‘pillars’.  The  first  pillar  referred  to  the 
traditional areas of economic policy which included all the policies connected with the functioning 
of  the  single  market.  This  pillar  was  organised  along  a  decision-making  regime  defined  as 
‘Community method’, because of the pre-eminence recognized to the supranational institutions. The 
second and third pillars, which were organized by an intergovernmental decision-making regime, 
referred respectively to the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and justice and home 
affairs (JHA). In these pillars, the pre-eminence was recognized to the member states governments, 
rather than to supranational institutions.  
The  Amsterdam  Treaty  of  1997  consolidated  this  institutional  development  and 
strengthened the role of the European Parliament (EP) in decision-making (Dehousse 1998). Till the 
1990s, the latter did not have any significant legislative powers despite being directly elected since 
1979.  Its powers were finally augmented recognizing its co-decisional powers with the Council of 
Ministers regarding the most important legislative acts.   
With these treaties, the EU consolidated a highly compounded institutional structure based 
on an unofficial principle of separation of powers (Fabbrini 2007). The Commission was recognized 
to have the role of an executive institutions, whereas legislative powers were shared by both the 
Council  of  Ministers  (representing  the  member  states’  governments)  and  the  Parliament 
(representing European voters), with the European Council (constituted by the heads of states and 
governments  meeting  three  times  a  year)  charged  with  the  role  of  identifying  the  long-term 
strategies of the organization. Moreover, this power-sharing system was supervised and protected 
by the European Court of Justice (ECJ), become a powerful judicial institution for settling the 
disputes between both national and supranational public institutions and public and private actors 
(Stone Sweet 2000). The Nice Treaty of 2001 rationalized such institutional architecture and began 
to address the complex institutional questions of enlargement to the east and the south.   
Moreover, the Charter of Rights was given recognition at Nice and the decision was taken 
to convene a constitutional convention to draft a constitutional treaty; decision thus implemented at 
the Laeken European Council in December 2001. A Constitutional Convention was thus organized 
in Brussels between 2002-2003 which brought to a Constitutional Treaty that, slightly revised by the 
member states governments, was signed by the European Council’s head of states and governments 
in  Rome  in  October  2004.  Refused  by  the  French  and  Dutch  electors  in  the  referenda  held 
respectively in May and June 2005, the Constitutional Treaty was thus largely re-assembled in three 
different parts and thus approved as a Reform Treaty by the European Council meeting held in 
Lisbon in December 2007 (Ziller 2008). 
The series of treaties that have served to provide a juridical basis to the EU should not lead 
to the conclusion that there has been a gradual and steady evolution of the integration project.  The 
gaps in time between them suggest that there have been periods of stagnation followed by brief but 
active periods of reform (Sandholtz and Stone Sweet 1998). Moreover, the institutionalization of the 
EU has also taken place without changes to the treaties. The periods of apparent stagnation were 
characterized by significant changes in inter-institutional relations, both within the EU and between 
its institutions and the member states.  The institutional impasse of the 1960s provided a space for  10   
the ECJ to assume an increasingly important role in adjudicating disputes between Community 
institutions and the member states.  
Two  ECJ  decisions  were  particularly  important:  van  Gend  en  Loos  in  1962  which 
established that European law had a direct effect on individuals and firms and Costa vs Enel in 1964 
which  celebrated  the  principle  that  European  law  is  superior  to  national  law.  The  ECJ’s 
interpretation of the treaties as superior to ordinary national legislation created the conditions for 
their  gradual  constitutionalization.  This  interpretation  was  partly  a  response  to  the  needs  of 
economic actors, especially firms and finance capital, to operate in a continental economy that had 
to be regulated in relatively uniform fashion (Stone Sweet, Sandholtz e Fligstein 2001). Direct 
effect and supremacy of European law allowed the Commission to both de-regulate national legal 
regimes while defining a supranational regulatory structure.  The ECJ and the Commission, with the 
growing support of the EP, then were marked as the institutions with the most committed European 
vocation; and certainly had the most to gain in terms of power and influence with the growth of a 
supranational system.   
The  establishment  of  the  ECJ’s  constitutional  role  was  the  result  of  a  complex  web  of 
alliances with national judiciaries, rather than with their national constitutional courts, and with the 
major national interest groups.  On the basis of Article 177 of the Treaty of Rome, national judges 
were able to seek recourse to the ECJ to resolve disputes arising over interpretations of Community 
law (Stone Sweet 2000). Although ECJ opinions were not formally binding, they were nonetheless 
assumed by various national courts as the legal basis to assess the compatibility between national 
and Community law.  The law courts, then, by-passed constitutional courts and became a sort of 
diffused control mechanism for the constitutionality of national legislation.  This raised questions 
about  the  established  principle  that  its  control  has  to  be  carried  out  only  through  special 
constitutional courts. If one considers that, in the EU, the main decision-makers are expression of 
direct or indirect electoral processes, they operate within a system in which powers are separated 
and their behaviour is checked by a multi-level judicial system, then it is plausible to argue that the 
EU is not only a regional supranational state (Schmidt 2006), but also a democratic one. Certainly, it 
is organized by a different democratic model than the ones of its member states. It is a model proper 
of a union of states which might be defined as a ‘compound democracy model’ (Fabbrini 2007). 
 
The scope of a political regionalism 
 
The institutionalization of the supranational EU was the result of the interaction between European 
and national institutions.  Certainly, the promotion of a homogeneous European economic space 
was fuelled by member states governments. Once French ostracism ended in the 1960s, the EU 
member  states  became  increasingly  active  participants  in  the  European  game  through  its  inter-
governmental institutions (such as the Council of Ministers). It was the neo-liberal agenda of the 
British government of the 1980s that generated consensus around privatization and liberalization 
that were the foundations of the single market and the common currency.  However, the interests of 
member  states  governments  had  to  be  conciliated  with  the  supranational  strategies  of  the 
Commission and then the Parliament, also because negative and positive integration fed off each 
other in this process.  
              The gradual elimination of national barriers (negative integration) that were an obstacle to 
the creation of a homogeneous market required the introduction at the Community level of new 
rules (positive integration) that only supranational actors could devise and promote. These new rules 
and forms of regulation were demanded by the same governmental and economic actors that were 
calling for liberalization and legally uniform continental market.  In sum, Margaret Thatcher and 
Jacques Delors helped each other. This was similar to what occurred in the US in the second half of 
the  nineteenth  century  and  the  first  decades  of  the  twentieth:  the  development  of  a  form  of 
capitalism  that  went  beyond  the  single  federated  state  required  a  symmetrical  form  of  federal 
regulation (Fabbrini 2005).  11   
With the creation of the single market, many issues related to the proper functioning of 
modern capitalism gradually became Europeanized. Policy areas that were traditionally within the 
national domain – such as environmental and consumer protection, the modernization of transport 
systems,  telecommunication  regulation,  regional  equality  and  research  –  have  shifted  to  the 
European level.  In some cases, it was the member states that favoured this shift.  In some cases, it 
was  spurred  on  by  trans-national  interest  groups,  experts,  social  movements,  and  networks 
mobilized  around  particular  interests.  In  other  cases,  it  was  the  Commission  or  the  European 
Parliament  pressured  by  private  economic  and  social  actors.    The  result  has  been  an  increased 
representativeness  of  these  two  institutions,  leading  the  Commission  and  Parliament  to  claim  a 
greater  role  in  the  European  decision-making  process.  Certainly,  it  was  not  just  the  ECJ,  the 
Commission and the EP that had an institutional interest in widening the range of EU competencies; 
the institutions representing national interests (the Council and the European Council) did not limit 
themselves to defending the status quo ante.  They also benefited from the institutionalization of a 
supranational system in that it allowed states to solve problems they could not address on their own 
(Milward 2000). 
The institutionalization of the EU has also extensively enlarged the scope of its activities.  
The EU has become a truly public policy regime; that is, an organization charged with the authority 
to promote a series of policies that are not easily bound together but related nonetheless (Cram 
1997).  International organizations are constituted on the basis of a common interest in pursuing 
particular objectives such as military security in the case of NATO or they can be arenas for trans-
national cooperation to achieve general objectives as is the case with peace and human rights in the 
United Nations.  
The  EU  is  not  an  organization  for  mutual  recognition  and  help  amongst  its  members.  
Precisely because its aims were at producing an ‘ever closer union’, the public policies objectives 
have  grown  in  quantity  and  quality.  An  increasing  number  of  policies  have  been  added  to  the 
original agricultural and trade policies of the 1950s.  The most notable of these are in the areas of 
economic governance, with a common policy on competition and a monetary policy (and currency) 
shared by now 15 member states (out of 27). The single currency is governed by the independent 
European Central Bank. In addition, the EU has structural funds to ensure social and territorial 
cohesion aimed at reducing inequality and creating stability for the single market. The EU has a 
fisheries policy, one for the Mediterranean, for the environment, research, telecommunications and 
a  fledgling  social  policy.  These  policies  are  all  part  of  the  first  pillar  and  therefore  subject  to 
qualified majority voting.   
After the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001, the EU has also strengthened cooperation 
in the areas of both the second and third pillars, as well as it has started to elaborate and implement 
security and military policies (Howorth 2007; 2002). Indeed, the three-pillars divisions of decision-
making  regimes  did  not  persist  as  expected.  A  process  of  cross-pillarization  has  altered  that 
division, because of the difficulty of separating policies which have many interconnected aspects 
(Stetter 2004). De facto, the two intergovernmental pillars have come to be influenced more and 
more by the supranational logic proper of the first Community pillar. The transformation of the EU 
into a public policy regime has drawn to it an increasing number of interest groups.  The high 
number of these groups operating in Brussels, which are more or less organized trans-nationally, 
indicates the decision-making relevance acquired by the EU supranational institutions (Della Sala 
and Ruzza 2007).  
Thus,  the  EU  has  assumed  many  ‘domestic’  characteristics  that  distinguish  it  from  any 
inter-governmental organization.  The very fact that its legislation is seen as superior to national law 
and is applicable to individuals and firms suggests a level of institutional integration that is not 
characteristic of other regional organizations. The ECJ has removed the discretionary power of 
national  governments  to  decide  whether  to  abide  by  or  not  Community  law;  and  it  has  bound 
citizens  to  Community  laws  directly  without  the  intermediaries  of  national  governments  or 
parliaments.    The  capacity  of  national  governments  to  act  unilaterally  or  arbitrarily  has  been  12   
curtailed significantly, although the enhancement of the public authority of the EU has taken place 
with their consent. The European treaties have thus become quasi-constitutional documents, on the 
basis  of  which  supra-states  features  have  been  established  in  order  to  check  the  centrifugal 
tendencies of inter-states relations. If sovereignty implies the capacity of state to have ultimate 
control over decisions within its territory, then in Europe there no longer exists something that can 
be defined as ‘national sovereignty’. European nation states have become EU member states (with 
the exception of few countries, such as Switzerland, Norway and Iceland) (Sbragia 1994). The 
formalization of the principle of qualified majority voting (in the first pillar but de facto used also in 
the other pillars) expresses the fact that decisions in the EU are not the sum of member states 
interests.  
The European nation state was the result of the institutionalization of centralized political 
authority that took place over centuries (Fabbrini 2007).  It was a process that was patterned after 
the  first  state-builders  such  as  France,  England  and  Spain  which  started  the  process  in  the 
seventeenth  century.    In  this  process,  the  definition  of  a  central  authority,  supported  by  an 
administrative apparatus as in France and Spain or by representative institutions as in England, was 
a necessary condition for the success of the building of the state. Even those states that were late 
arrivals  to  the  state-building  process  adopted  similar  features.  It  was  the  administrative  and 
representative apparatus of Prussia and Piedmont that allowed them to conquer and consolidate 
territories that became, respectively, Germany and Italy in the second half of the nineteenth century. 
The new authorities were quickly identified by their capacity to control territory (Spruyt 1994).  The 
formation of the territorial state coincided with the exercise of the legal authority and functional 
capacity of public power. 
The EU experience has been diametrically opposed to these state-building experiences.  The 
EU does not emerge from a central authority nor was its expansion supported by an administrative 
apparatus. It is the expression of a voluntary aggregation of previously distinct territorial states 
which decided to pool together their own sovereignty. Certainly, the institutionalization of a union 
of states which is inevitable hostile to centralization has not lack incongruity.  For instance, in the 
EU there is a disjunction between legality and functionality, in the sense that not all member states 
have signed on the Schengen Agreement (1991) or are part of the single currency (the Euro). 
 However,  if  one  consider  a  similar  experience  of  union  of  states  through  voluntary 
aggregation, as the US, then such disjunctions appear less unusual than it is generally thought.  
Although the 2007 Lisbon Treaty has still left many opting-outs, it represents an important step 
forward. The EU has acquired a legal personality in general terms. It has overcome the three pillars 
structure, formalizing its system of separation of powers. It has recognized a treaty-status to the 
Charter of Rights which was celebrated (but not adopted) in the 2001 Nice Treaty. Last but not 
least, the Lisbon Treaty has also created the institutional conditions for the development of a more 
consistent EU foreign and security policy.  
The EU is going to play a growing role in the international system, not only as economic 
power (as it is doing in trade negotiation since its inception, Meunier 2005) but also as a political 
power. In sum, the EU has become a case of a regional organization with political features, a 
supranational polity functioning according to the logic of a compound democracy. Europe has gone 
beyond Westphalia, transforming the international relation of its nation states in the domestic basis 
of the supranational EU. No other existing regional organization has gone so far in overcoming the 
Westphalian  principle  of  sovereignty.  This  is  why  the  EU  might  be  conceptualized  as  a  post-
Westphalian polity (Cooper 2003).  
 
Economic Regionalism: the institutions of inter-states cooperation 
 
Asia-Pacific  economic regionalism 
ASEAN,  APEC,  MERCOSUR  and  NAFTA  are  not  an  answer  to  historical  conflicts 
between nearby states which brought to dramatic wars. They are economic pacts, rather than peace  13   
pacts. Probably, MERCOSUR is the only regional agreement which has tried to inaugurate a new 
political  phase  of  cooperation  between  two  traditional  rival  states  as  Brazil  and  Argentina.  
Although ASEAN came into existence in the second half of the 1960s, the other three regional 
organizations are the expression of the possibilities of inter-states cooperation opened up by the end 
of the Cold War (Haggard 1997). Indeed, ASEAN in 1992 has been phasing in a Free Trade Area 
(AFTA) for its members, AFTA’s goal being the lowering of tariffs overall  and the elimination of 
them on certain items imported from other member countries. In sum, “the end of Cold War helped 
to break sown longstanding barriers to regional identity: Vietnam admission to ASEAN (in 1995, 
n.d.r.) is an excellent example of the point” (Ravenhill 2002: 175). Since the beginning, ASEAN 
(1967) and APEC (1989) have acquired the features of trans-governmental organizations, in the 
sense  that  business  groups  of  different  countries  have  interacted  directly  within  the  inter-
governmental framework (Aggarwal 1994).  
ASEAN  and  APEC  are  custom  unions,  whose  decision-making  system  is  based  on 
consensus-unanimity, although the former has introduced in 1996 some forms of majority voting 
regarding very limited issues (Ravenhill 2001). It was the Asian crisis of the second half of the 
1990s (and its mismanagement by international financial institutions) that created, among Asian 
countries,  the  perception  of  the  need  to  act  collectively  in  order  to  counter  outside  negative 
influence (Higgott 1998). Since then the quest for Asian collaboration has remained strategic for 
many Asian countries, although its development followed an uncertain path, moving from a general 
trade liberalization agenda to a more sectorally-based approach. Because APEC is an organization 
including  developed  and  developing  countries,  democratic  and  non-democratic  countries,  it  has 
been characterized by huge asymmetry (in terms of economic power and trade capability) between 
them. With the entrance of China in 1991 and Russia in 1998, the asymmetrical complexity of the 
organization  has  increased  dramatically  (Yamazawa  and  Hirata  1996).  Different  needs  and 
contrasting interests were not easily conciliated. Certainly the experience of the crisis and the fear to 
be marginalized in a world trade constrained by powerful regional blocs, as the EU and NAFTA 
(created in 1994) has fostered the demand for economic collaboration between the states in the 
Pacific Area. Indeed, in the case of APEC, having the US within the organization has been a way 
for counterbalancing its relation with Europe. 
Given these huge economic and political asymmetries, both ASEAN and APEC are regional 
organization  with  light  and  horizontal  governance  structures  (see  Table  1).  They  do  not  have 
established compliance mechanisms, being based on loose resolution practices (ASEAN) or clearly 
voluntary ones (APEC). Their operation is not based on supra-states institutions and actors. ASEAN 
has  a  3-years  meeting  of  heads  of  state  and  government,  whereas  APEC  has  more  operative 
continuity  thanks  to  the  annual  meeting  of  governmental  leaders.  Indeed,  the  APEC  Leaders 
Meeting is the main decision-making forum of the organization. “APEC leader set goals, publicize 
them, and provide momentum for the process. This is usually held in November of each year, and is 
attended by heads of state except for those from Taiwan (Chinese Taipei) and Hong Kong who send 
other representatives” (Nanto 2002: 5). Many APEC operative decisions are first considered in the 
annual  ministerial  meetings  with  their  functional  composition  (trade,  finance,  transportation, 
telecommunications, human resources development (education), energy, environment, science and 
technology, and small and medium size enterprises). Of course, these ministerial meetings cannot be 
equated  to  the  EU  Council  of  Ministers.  The  largest  ministerial  is  the  annual  Joint  Ministerial 
Meeting which meets for preparing the Leaders Meeting. Finance ministers and heads of central 
banks are generally the main actors of the Joint Ministerial Meeting.  
ASEAN has a Secretariat (in Jakarta) with ministerial status, several (29-30) committees of 
senior  officials  and  more  than  hundred  (122)  working  groups  on  the  various  policy  issues, 
complemented by a limited number of specialized (but non independent) agencies. APEC has a 
Secretariat (in Singapore) of a couple of dozens civil servants, supported by a limited number of 
committees (3) and working groups of experts (10) that deal with economic issues of importance to 
the region. The former are: the Committee on Trade and Investment, the Economic Committee and  14   
the  Budget  and  Administrative  Committee.  The  latter  are:  trade  and  investment  data,  trade 
promotion, industrial science and technology, human resources development, energy cooperation, 
marine  resource  conservation,  telecommunication,  transportation,  tourism  and  fisheries.  Each 
working group is coordinated by a representative of one of the members. Regarding their trans-
governmental side, a part from the celebratory Eminent  Person Groups, instituted in 1992, with the 
duty of developing a vision for APEC future, it is the APEC Business Advisory Council (ABAC), 
instituted  in  1995,  which  has  come  to  play  an  influential  role.  ABAC  consists  of  up  to  three 
members appointed by each APEC member and recommend APEC governments on issues related 
to trade, investment, finance and technology.  
In sum, both ASEAN and APEC are carefully not to invade areas different from trade and 
economic cooperation. In particular, “APEC had carefully kept its distance from security matters for 
fear that such issues would cause division within the group, particularly among China, Taiwan, the 
United States, Japan and Russia. Such divisions could thwart cooperation in achieving economic 
goals” (Nanto 2002: 7). Since 1995, the consensus among APEC leaders has been that regional 
security issues have to be discussed in other fora or in the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). For 
example, “although APEC confines its agenda to economic issues, the heads of state at bilateral 
meetings  conducted  before  and  after  the  Leaders  Meetings  have  discussed  concerns  over 
international security, human rights, and other issues” (Ibidem: 6). The ARF meets generally after 
the ASEAN Ministerial Conference and includes the ten members of the organization, plus US, 
China, Russia, Japan, South Korea, Australia, New Zealand, Canada and the EU.  
In conclusion, both ASEAN and APEC lack any political identity. There are no rooms for a 
leadership’s role and functions within these organizations. Both are economic regionalisms which 
encourage  the  voluntarily  liberalization  of  the  national  economies  of  the  area.  Both  oscillate 
between  open  and  closed  regionalism,  in  the  sense  there  is  no  stable  consensus  among  their 
members on whether to discriminate (closed regionalism) or not (open regionalism) non-members 
in trading relations.  
For  instance,  Japan  has  permanently  pressed  for  according  the  benefits  of  APEC  trade 
liberalization to non-APEC trading partners on a most favored nation basis, while members with a 
smaller  economy  have  been  more  cautious  in  opening  up  barriers  in  all  the  economic  sectors. 
Indeed, from the 1998 crisis onwards “East Asian governments began actively negotiating bilateral 
preferential  agreements”  (Ravenhill  2002:  179)  outside  the  organization.  Powerful  domestic 
protectionist interests in Japan and Korea (in agriculture, fisheries and forestry) have stalled the 
liberalization  policy  within  APEC  and  between  the  latter  and  other  Asian  countries.  More  in 
general,  the  longstanding  (political  and  economic)  rivalry  between  the  most  powerful  Asian 
countries (such as Japan and China, both members of APEC which never dealt publicly with the 
responsibilities of their own historical past) represents a permanent hurdle in the path towards a 
more effective Asian cooperation (Hemmer and Katzenstein 2002).  
Thus, Asian regionalism seems to be squeezed between two opposing forces. On one side, 
there is the necessity to cooperate for dealing with the other regional blocs in Europe and North 
America.  On  the  other  side,  Asian  countries  have  not  yet  elaborated  a  common  narrative  for 
constructing  an  Asian  identity  both  sufficiently  inclusive  of  their  differences  and  sufficiently 
capable of supporting their working together. 
 
American economic regionalism 
 
MERCOSUR  AND  NAFTA  have  remained  inter-governmental  organizations.  Both  regional 
organizations  are  homogeneous  in  terms  of  the  political  system  of  their  members,  but  quite 
asymmetrical in terms of power relations between them. The predominance of (respectively) Brazil 
and the US is undisputed This why MERCOSUR and NAFTA represent a hierarchical model of 
regionalism (see Table 1), contrary to ASEAN and APEC organized along the line of a horizontal 
model.  MERCOSUR  was  found  in  1991  with  the  Treaty  of  Asuncion,  with  the  program  of  15   
establishing a free trade area by 1994, thus a custom union by 1995 and finally a common market 
and a common external commercial policy (Bulmer-Thomas 2001). Its political aim was to stabilize 
the  new  democratic  systems  of  the  South  Cone  which  were  emerging  from  the  authoritarian 
experiences  of  the  previous  decades  (Hurrell  2001).  “The  key  to  the  emergence  of 
MERCOSUR…was the development of closer relations between Argentina and Brazil from the 
mid-1980s as both returned to democracy and began economic liberalization” (Mechan 2003: 376). 
Since its inception, however, MERCOSUR was conditioned by the interests of Brazil.  Brazil has a 
longstanding ‘big country’ perspective. “From a geo-strategic perspective, Brazil uses MERCOSUR 
as a political and economic alliance to confront other powers, in particular the US in the FTAA 
(Free Trade Area of Americas, n.d.r.)  and the WTO, and the EU in the EU-MERCOSUR context 
and in the WTO” (Klom 2003: 352). In fact, with both US and EU, Brazil has a contentiousness 
concerning the trade of agricultural products. To contain the expansive presence of the US in Latin 
America, it is much more effective, for Brazil, to act as the leader of a regional bloc than as a single, 
although big, country. This is why Brazil has always opposed any supranational development of the 
organization  (requested  by  the  small  members  as  Uruguay  and  Paraguay,  but  also  Argentina), 
protecting its inter-governmental character.  
The ‘political’ potential of the organization has thus been kept under control by Brazil, 
which,  however,  has  accepted  that  MERCOSUR  should  move  beyond  trade  liberalization  in 
direction  of  a  common  market  program.  Indeed,  because  of  the  need  to  institutionalize  the 
cooperation between Brazil and Argentina, once they became stable democratic systems, in 1994 
the MERCOSUR countries (with the Ouro Preto Protocal) agreed in giving a legal personality to the 
organization.  
However,  MERCOSUR  norms  are  not  community  laws,  but  international  laws,  which 
require national action for being implemented. Nevertheless, MERCOSUR legal system mirrors the 
ambiguity of Latin America legal systems:  “while treaties incorporate far-reaching commitmets, 
implementation lacks discipline and rules are flouted” (Mechan 2003: 386). Influenced by the EU 
experience,  and  actively  supported  by  the  EU  institutions  (and  the  Commission  in  particular), 
MERCOSUR has tried to advance along the road of institutionalization. Indeed, after the Ouro Preto 
Protocol,  “the  MERCOSUR  process,  as  a  measure  of  trade  liberalization  with  a  protectionist 
dimension  (common  market,  common  external  borders),  had  a  similar  effect  on  international 
sentiment as the European Community process had during the 1960s” (Klom 2003: 354).  
Nevertheless,  the  promise  has  not  been  maintained.  The  asymmetrical  relation  between 
Brazil  and  the  other  members  has  represented  an  insurmountable  hurdle  for  the  creation  of  a 
supranational authority in economic matters. Brazil covers around 75 per cent of total assets (trade, 
GDP, population) of MERCOSUR, while, for example, Germany covers only 33 per cent in the EU. 
Moreover, no policies for re-allocating resource from richer to poorer states are in operation in the 
MERCOSUR,  making  the  latter  countries  mainly  dependent  on  the  former.  In  sum,  Brazilian 
domestic policies have continued to be the real engine of MERCOSUR common market policies. 
The late 1990s Argentina crisis has further exacerbated the dominant role of Brazil.  
This  is  why  progress  within  MERCOSUR  has  been  uneven,  notwithstanding  formal 
declaration  in  favour  of  deeper  integration.    The  absence  of  an  effective  supranational  dispute 
mechanism  (that  is  of  an  independent  judicial  body),  although  envisioned  by  the  Ouro  Preto 
Protocal  of  1994,  has  complicated  the  process  of  reciprocal  policy  harmonization  between  its 
members. Disputes are discussed by ad-hoc inter-governmental arbitration panel which do not enjoy 
any  real  compliance’s  powers.  Their  decisions,  although  formally  mandatory,  “were  neither 
immediately  applicable  nor  have  direct  effect,  so  members  need  not  necessarily  enforce  them” 
(Bouzas and Soltz 2001: 107). Indeed, handling disputes case by case has undermined the legal 
unity of the organization. Moreover, Brazil, but also Argentina, has been unwilling to promote 
rigorous structural adjustment policies within their own economies in order to advance along the 
road  of  building  an  effective  common  market.  They  have  not  developed  even  a  collective 
macroeconomic position (Preusse 2001).   16   
MERCOSUR  has  paid  the  effects  of  an  ‘institutional  deficit’.  Its  institutional  under-
development is an effect of a lack of political will in promoting the means for reaching the aims 
proclaimed in the Asuncion Treaty. For instance, the latter established two key inter-governmental 
bodies: the Common Market Council (constituted by ministers of economic affairs with the role of 
giving  political  direction)  and  the  Common  Market  Group  (constituted  by  officials  charged  of 
macroeconomic and policy coordination). However, the two bodies have not worked as expected. 
Decisions have been taken more in the twice-a-year presidential summits, organized by the six-
month rotating presidency (which has had, however, more an organizational than an agenda-setting 
role).  The  daily  operation  of  the  organization  is  in  the  hands  of  a  small  Secretariat  located  in 
Montevideo,  supported  by  working  and  ad  hoc  groups.  In  sum,  it  does  not  seem  that  the 
MERCOSUR (and thus Brazil) has been able to play an effective role in balancing the influence of 
the US in the Americas. In sum, MERCOSUR, “while it achieved initial success in stimulating 
intraregional trade growth, in other areas of development it has proved less successful” (Mechan  
2003: 384). 
Also the North America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)
2, signed by Mexico, Canada and 
the United States in 1992 and which went into effect on 1 January 1994, clearly has a different 
history,  objectives  and  nature  than  the  EU  (Milner  1998).    Indeed,  it  displays  also  important 
differences  with  the  other  regional  economic  organizations.  It  has  a  very  high  economic 
differentiation (the largest and most dynamic economy alongside a newly industrialized country), a 
profound  political  asymmetry  (the  hyper-power  in  the  world  system  alongside  medium-sized 
powers  with  limited  military  capacity)  and  unusual  geographical  features  (the  longest  borders 
shared by states).  NAFTA is less ambitious than the MERCOSUR, in the sense that its aims remain 
essentially those proper of a trade agreement.  Given that tariffs across the three countries’ borders 
(and particularly between Canada and the US) have largely disappeared, the nature of the agreement 
geared largely at solving disputes on other trade-related items.  Like MERCOSUR and contrary to 
the  supranational  EU,  the  NAFTA  is  a  purely  inter-governmental  organization.  However, 
notwithstanding the presence of the international system’s only super-power in that organization, 
NAFTA has created a highly structured and regularized decision-making regime.   
Why did NAFTA come about? Mexico and Canada had long-standing fears of the political 
and cultural effects of a closer relationship with the US. However, by the 1990s these seemed to be 
offset by the perceived need to ensure trade rules against rising US protectionism. The economic 
motivations  were  thus  supplemented  by  political  hopes  of  bringing  about  changes  in  forms  of 
economic governance within the two countries (Clarkson 2000).  But US motives for pursuing 
NAFTA did not seem so obvious other than the argument that a super-power, if democratic, will 
always seek rules that institutionalize its advantage (Mansfield and Milner 1999: 611). The period 
beginning in the mid-1980s, during the Reagan presidency, marked a turning point in the approach 
of the US to regional trade agreements (RTAs).  The US went from being an active promoter and 
guarantor of a multilateral post-war economic order in which it provided the political and military 
guarantees  for  regional  blocs  far  from  its  shores,  to  being  an  active  participant  in  regional 
arrangements (Haggard 1997).   
This shift accelerated in the 1990s and with the end of the Cold War.  Since the mid-1990s, 
the  US  has  entered  into  a  series  of  regional  free  trade  agreements  of  different  intensity  and 
commitment.    The  most  advanced  of  these  is  NAFTA,  but  APEC  deserves  mentioning  simply 
because of the importance of trade with Asia and the serious trade deficits that the U.S. has run with 
its Pacific partners.  The US trade performance is an important part of the story of its conversion to 
RTAs.  There emerged, in response to growing trade deficits in the 1980s, an aggressive application 
of U.S. trade law, especially with respect to anti-dumping.  From the US point of view, RTAs were 
                                                           
2 The section on NAFTA relies on a previous paper written with Vincent Della Sala, Beyond Empire and New 
medievalism: Bounded Hegemony in the EU and NAFTA. I thank Vincent Della Sala for letting me to use the 
section in question.  17   
means by which to guarantee ‘fair’ trade rules that enshrined its approach to economic governance 
(Wyatt-Walter 1995). For potential partners, the aggressive application of trade law set off alarm 
bells and a search for ways to guarantee market access.   
There were a number of initiatives in the 1980s that laid the groundwork for the NAFTA 
agreement  (Mittelman  and  March  2000).    The  most  important  of  these  was  the  Canada-United 
States Free Trade Agreement (CUSFTA) which came into effect in 1989. Negotiations between the 
two countries had begun in 1985 and concluded with a trade agreement that dealt primarily with 
solving  disputes  and  ensuring  access  than  the  removal  of  tariffs  and  duties.  The  CUSFTA 
introduced dispute settlement mechanisms and guaranteed national treatment for American firms 
investing in Canada. The agreement opened the way for an RTA with Mexico. The US and Mexico 
began negotiations in 1991 after Congress granted fast-track approval which meant that any future 
pact would not be held up in the legislature once it was approved. Canada joined the negotiations 
shortly after and an accord was reached relatively quickly. The change in the US presidency in 1993 
brought a Democrat to the White House who had promised to re-visit certain provisions that applied 
to labour and the environment. On trade and the environment were introduced minimum standards 
and signed a commitment by the partners to set up mechanisms for monitoring their respect. Groups 
concerned with the environment and labour in all three countries were able to exploit the open 
character of the US legislative process for putting pressure on the new administration in order to 
introduce some level of protection.   
The main provisions of the NAFTA reflected a concern with trying to place some limits on 
the application of American trade policy and to subject it to the logic of a regional agreement.  The 
main mechanism for this has been the binding dispute settlement mechanism that resolves disputes 
between  member  states  or  between  economic  actors  and  member  states.    Article  1904  of  the 
NAFTA provides an alternative to the domestic courts to resolve disputes on anti-dumping and 
countervailing duties.  Chapter 20 of the agreement spells out the procedures and provisions of the 
settlement mechanism, which begins with a government to government meeting.  If this does not 
bring about a resolution, then the matter can be sent to the NAFTA Free Trade Commission, which 
is comprised of the trade ministers of the states involved.  If the matter is not settled here, a state 
may request that a five-member panel be formed to settle the dispute.  The panellists are chosen 
from  a  roster  of  names,  with  each  country  choosing  two  and  the  choice  of  the  fifth  member 
alternating with each dispute between the two countries.  The fact that the US has agreed to have a 
judicial body that is not part of its formal constitutional structure and is formally a trans-national 
institution  is  not  insignificant.  One  only  needs  to  remember  that  it  has  refused  to  sign  on  the 
International Criminal Court because it does not accept that an external judicial body can override 
the US legal system.  Mexico and Canada have sought to insulate their commercial relationship 
from the application of American trade law in American courts.  The US, on the other hand, has 
been willing to accept the settlement mechanism as it is less cumbersome than the GATT/WTO 
route.   
From  the  point  of  view  of  creating  a  free  trade  area  that  provides  stable  relationships, 
NAFTA has had some success. While Mexican-Canadian trade remains marginal, on the whole 
NAFTA has become central to the commercial policy of all three partners.  The dispute settlement 
mechanism  for  anti-dumping  and  countervail  issues  has  been  used  extensively  by  all  three 
governments and has brought a measure of protection to the smaller partners of the agreement.  The 
NAFTA members are not concerned simply with trade. They represent economic interests that go 
beyond the application of trade law, such as the protection of investor rights.  This reflects an 
important  feature  of  the  North  American  economy,  where  a  great  deal  of  cross-border  trade  is 
carried out within the various branches of the same multinational firm.  
Mexico,  and  to  an  even  greater  extent  Canada,  have  been  described  as  ‘branch  plant’ 
economies because large parts of their industrial base are satellites of US multinationals.  This intra-
firm international trade is less likely to generate disputes about dumping and government subsidies; 
but it may lead to questions about the free movement of capital and protection of foreign direct  18   
investment.  Multinational  firms  were  concerned  that  the  increasing  trans-nationalization  of 
production across the North American continent would not be subject to constraints on investment, 
such as employment protection.  One mechanism to protect foreign investment was the national 
treatment; that is, foreign firms cannot be treated any differently than domestic actors. 
Chapter 11 of the NAFTA outlines two important measures that are seen to provide an 
unprecedented level of protection for investors: the first section outlines the obligations that host 
countries have towards investors and the second provides a dispute settlement mechanism.  The 
obligations assumed by governments include not only national treatment by foreign investment but 
also  prohibit  the  use  of  performance  criteria  for  approval  of  incoming  capital.    For  instance, 
governments could not stipulate that foreign investors have to respect domestic content rules in 
production or require multinational firms to share their technology.   
More importantly, restrictions are placed on the capacity for governments to expropriate or 
nationalize investments.  The onus of proof of the protection of the public good was now on them to 
present in an arbitration tribunal and not even their domestic courts.  The second part of Chapter 11 
introduces  an  innovation  known  as  “investor-to-state”  cases,  in  which  multinationals  may  sue 
NAFTA governments (including those at the sub-national level) for policies that they allege harms 
their investments and contravenes investment obligations assumed by governments in the first part 
of Chapter 11.  Foreign investors, primarily multinational firms, who feel that their investments are 
harmed by a NAFTA member state can choose to bypass domestic courts and seek recourse through 
the World Bank’s International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) or the 
rules of the United Nations Commission for International Trade Law (UNCITRAL Rules).  
Additionally,  domestic  courts  are  bound  to  enforce  the  awards  found  by  the  arbitration 
tribunals.  Chapter  11  was  favoured  by  the  Canadian  and  particularly  the  Mexican  government 
because  it  would  provide  measures  of  guarantees  to  the  investors  who  looked  wearily  at  past 
protectionist and interventionist measures north and south of the American border.  From a domestic 
point of view, it would entrench a commitment to economic liberalization and make it difficult for 
future  governments  to  reverse  the  broad  direction  of  economic  governance.    For  Mexican 
governments, Chapter 11 sent a strong signal that economic liberalization programs that began in 
the wake of the debt crisis of the early 1980s would now be subject to an external constraint and not 
to the whims of domestic politics.   
NAFTA has the governance structure of an inter-governmental organization. Its locus of 
institutionalization is an agreement on a free trade area with a limited institutional architecture.  
However, the dispute settlement mechanisms do exert a degree of independence and form clear 
institutional boundaries between the member states and the implementation of stable and durable 
rules. Its decisions are binding. The decision-making process is highly structured and regularized 
and it is based on a one a year Cabinet-level representative meetings. There are many (25) trilateral 
committees and ad hoc working groups working on different economic and trade issues. The scope 
of activity is also limited compared to the EU.  
Although NAFTA does not have a security component, in the wake of the 11 September 
terrorist attack and the economic fallout of having closed border crossings for the better part of a 
week, it became apparent that there was a challenge in maintaining an open economic border and 
securing  border  crossings.    There  has  emerged  a  discussion  about  creating  a  North  American 
perimeter so that American security concerns may be extended to all of NAFTA’s borders.  It is not 
likely that this development will lead to a political development of the organization, although it 
reveals the pressures for a greater institutionalization of a regional trade agreement including a 
super-power. 
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Table 2  Institutionalisation of Regional Organizations: A comparison (2000 – 2008) 
  ASEAN 
Association 
of Southern 
Asian 
Nations 
(1967) 
APEC 
Asian 
Pacific 
Economic 
Cooperation 
(1989) 
MERCOSUR 
Mercado 
Comun del Sur 
( 1991) 
NAFTA 
North 
American 
Free 
Trade 
Agreement 
(1994 
APEC 
Asian Pacific 
Economic 
Cooperation 
(1989) 
Founders 
Indonesia, 
Malaysia, 
Philippines,  
Singapore, 
Thailand 
Indonesia, 
Singapore, 
Brunei,  
Malaysia, 
Phi1ippines, 
Thailand, 
Australia, 
Japan, New 
Zealand,  
South Korea. 
And Canada 
.Brazil, 
Argentina,, 
Paraguay, 
Uruguay 
lJSA, Canada, 
Mexico 
France, 
Germany, ltaly,  
Belgium, The 
Netherlands,  
Luxemburg 
Joiners 
1984- Brunei 
Darussalam  
1995- Vietnam  
1997-Laos and 
Myanmar  
1999- 
Cambodia 
1991-Cbina, 
Hong Kong, 
Taiwan  
1993- 
Mexico and 
Papua New 
Guinea  
1994-Chile  
1998- Peru, 
Russia, 
Vietnam 
1996 – 
Chile(associate) 
1997 – Bolivia 
(associate) 
2010 - 
Venezuela 
Development 
of AFT A (US 
and Canada) 
1973- UK, 
Denmark, 
Ireland  
1981-Greeee  
1986-Spam and 
Portugal  
1995- Austria, 
Finland,  
Sweden :}  
(2004-
2007~Central, 
East and  
Southern 
European 
Countries 
Member 
States 
10  21  7  3  27 
Nature  Inter/trans-
governmental 
Inter/trans-
governmental 
Inter- 
governmental 
Inter- 
governmental 
Supranational 
Scope  Economic 
collaboration 
Free Trade Area 
Economic 
cooperation/ 
coordination 
(Customs 
Union) 
Customs union  Free Trade 
Agreement 
Political Union 
Decision- 
making 
style 
Flexible Consensus 
(1996majority 
voting) 
Consensus - 
Unanimity 
Flexible 
consensus 
Highly 
structured and 
regularized 
Highly 
structured  
supranational- 
single market  
Intergovernmental 
– foreign policy 
Compliance  Loose dispute  Voluntary  Ad hoc  Binding  ECJ – Highly  20   
resolution 
mechanisms 
arbitration 
panel (chosen 
by a roster of 
judges) 
dispute 
resolutions 
mechanisms 
binding 
Operation 
- 3 years meeting 
of heads of state / 
and government 
- Ministerial 
Conference 
~annual 
meeting of 
finance 
ministers and 
heads of 
central  
bank s and 
others  
-annually 
rotating 
chair 
-annual 
leaders 
meeting  
- twice a year 
presidential 
summits 
- six month 
rotating 
presidency 
-once a year 
Cabinet level  
representatives 
meeting 
- twice a year 
European council 
- quasi permanent 
council of 
Ministers 
- Community 
coordination 
 
Structure  -Secretariat 
(Jakarta) with  
ministerial status  
- 29 committees of 
senior officials  
- 122 technical 
working groups  
-specialized 
agencies  
-Secretariat 
(Singapore) 
of 23 civil 
servants 
(2001) -3 
committees 
-10 working 
groups 
Secretariat 
(Montevideo) 
-Common 
Market Council  
- working 
groups 
(Common 
Market Group) 
- ad hoc groups 
25 trilateral 
committees  
-ad hoc 
working 
groups 
Highly 
structured  
(Commission, 
EP, Council of 
the Union, 
COREPER  
Committees) 
International 
status 
None 
None 
None (de facto)  None  Yes - in 
economic and 
trade Forums 
(since Rome 
1957) and in 
political forums 
(since Lisbon 
2007 – if 
approved) 
 
 
In conclusion, regional organizations differ significantly. Joseph Grieco (1997) has used 
three criteria – locus of institutionalization, scope of activity and level of institutional authority – to 
compare the new regional arrangements in the Americas, East Asia and Europe emerged in the post-
Cold War era.  This approach, which examines the legal basis of regional blocs, what they do and 
their capacity, is a useful exercise for understanding the new power relationship at the global level.  
It is also useful to include the EU in this comparative endeavour. However, it would be misleading 
to consider the EU as a pole of a continuum between regional organizations. Indeed, the EU is also 
a political entity, although in the process of institutionalization, and not only an economic one. Only 
the  EU,  if  its  process  of  institutionalization  will  proceed  successfully,  will  have  eventually  the 
possibility  to  make  more  plural  the  political  governance  of  the  international  system.  For  what 
concerns  the  other  regionalisms,  their  role  will  continue  to  be  delimited  to  the  governance  of 
economic and trade issues. 
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Not Only New Medievalism  
 
Why have these regional experiences been assimilated (at least as an analogy) to the medieval 
system of governing?  In the medieval order, no single ruler was vested with supreme political 
authority  (or  sovereignty)  over  a  particular  territory  or  population.    Authority  was  divided  and 
shared both upwards and downwards, with multiple and overlapping sites of legitimate political 
rule. Despite the best efforts of popes and the Holy Roman emperor, there was no recognition of a 
single universal, temporal power within a given territory.  
            On the juridical front, different legal orders (such as common law, customary law and civil 
law), based on different Christian, German and Roman traditions, co-existed and competed amongst 
themselves.    With  a  weak  or  non-existent  centre,  even  the  administration  of  justice  became  a 
complex affair. Because of the existence of such a multitude of regional organizations and of the 
regulatory extension of old (IMF and World Bank) and new global institutions and regimes (such as 
the WTO or the UN Commission on Human Rights), the post Cold War international system has 
been  equated  to  a  sort  of  new  medieval  order  (Gamble  and  Payne  1996).  According  to  this 
argument,  the  new  regional  blocs  (Gamble  2001)  and  the  several  inter-governmental  forms  of 
cooperation (Slaughter 2004) complement the decline of territorial states.   
Certainly, the indicators that evoke the medieval order are numerous.  Private international 
violence, such as terrorism, has established itself as an unprecedented form of international power.  
The  growth  of  international  organizations  has  been  unrelenting  as  has  been  the  transnational 
mobility of information, capital, technology and individuals.  These factors do not mean that the 
state will disappear; rather, it will have to share power in the international order with other domestic 
and supranational actors.  The point is that, in the new medieval order, no actor can claim within a 
territory exclusive sovereignty or independent authority. Even the hyper-Westphalian states of US 
or China or Russia have to recognize the existence of trade or human rights international regimes 
which constraints their rooms of manoeuvre.  
The world order, which is becoming highly institutionalised, is organised around multiple 
centres  of  inter-governmental  organizations,  be  they  regional  organizations  or  networks  of 
ministers, judges and diplomats. In this order, regional aggregations are assuming many of the 
functions that were the domain of states in the past.  They have created new institutions that go 
beyond the state for the co-ordination and cooperation in managing trade but also other issues. For 
instance, they largely contributed (as in the case of MERCOSUR) in stabilizing the democratic 
nature of their members’ political system.  
The result has been the institutionalization of global structures of mutual interdependence 
and support.  New institutional authorities have emerged although none has had the power for 
imposing  its  will  on  the  others.  In  sum,  they  co-exist  and  compete  just  as  they  did  in  the  old 
medieval order. As John Ruggie (1998) argued, the world polity is in a transition from a modern to 
a  post-modern  era.    In  the  post-modern  international  order  there  are  no  hierarchies  of  power. 
Economic and cultural globalization has eroded states’ territorial boundaries, enmeshing even the 
largest and powerful ones in a web of institutional interdependence. Probably, the world has not 
become cosmopolitan but it is certain much plural than it ever was. This is why post-modernity 
seems to resemble more the pluralism of pre-modernity than the standardization and uniformity of 
modernity.  
To be sure the world is organized through a panoply of regional organizations and global 
institutions  and  regimes.  However,  as  we  have  shown  comparing  the  most  relevant  cases  of 
regionalism, that institutional pluralism has very different political implications for the world order. 
All the regional organizations, but the EU, have an economic nature. As other networks of inter-
governmental  cooperation,  they  do  not  play  any  significant  role  in  political  global  governance, 
although they are certainly influential in the management of economic or human rights issues. The 
EU  is  the  only  example  of  regional  organization  which  is  assuming  an  importance  as  an 
international political actor, although its global potentials are still largely underdeveloped.  Because  22   
political  and  economic  global  governance,  although  interconnected,  are  distinct,  then  the  post-
modern structure of the latter does not preclude the persistence of a modern structure in the former. 
Certainly,  the  interconnection  between  global  politics  and  global  economics  has  shown  the 
structural limits of any imperial strategy (and interpretation).  
A plural world is inhospitable for empires, as the US has had to learn in Iraq. The US has no 
the economic resources for sustaining an imperial policy, nor it controls the legitimacy resources for 
justifying it. However, an economic plural world continues to be in need for some form of political 
governance, a possibility that has been overlooked in the New Medievalism argument. While there 
may not be an epicentre to the economic international system, there is still one to the political 
international system. This epicentre continues to be constituted by the more powerful states – and 
the US above the others. Certain issues (such as military security, conflict resolutions and political 
stability) are outside the capability of many regional or inter-governmental organizations.  
If it is true that even a hyper-power has to behave within the constraints of the international 
and domestic multilateral decision-making structures, then the US has no other option than to play a 
hegemonic, and not imperial, role (Ikenberry 2006). Hegemony implies not only the recognition that 
power has to be exercised within multilateral arrangements. It implies also the recognition of the 
other countries’ interests and values, and not only those of the hegemon.  
Hegemony concerns the exercise not only of hard power but especially of soft power (Nye 
2008). Hegemony is necessarily a bounded behaviour. The hegemonic power operates within the 
constraints of rules that (in the case of the US) it has designed itself and actors that do not depend 
on it. Clearly, rules set by the powerful will always tend to reflect a position of strength; but they 
also  imply  that  political  rule  will  not  be  arbitrary.  Certainly,  hegemonic  power  is  easier  to  be 
exercised in regional blocs where one power is clearly in a much more powerful position than its 
partners than it might be in broader multilateral organizations. For instance, the US found it easier 
to dictate terms of trade agreements with Mexico and Canada within NAFTA than it has within the 
WTO or the UN Security Council.  However, rules constitute the binding of power subjecting its 
use to limits.   
The new world order will become stable only when the US will recognize that system’s 
military unipolarity will not translate automatically in across-the-board predominance. For both its 
domestic and international constraints, the US has no choice but to act globally as a hegemonic 
power.  When  the  US  under-evaluates  the  structural  relevance  of  such  constraints,  then  it  is 
inevitable that it will be forcefully contested (Fabbrini 2006). 
 
Conclusion 
 
In sum, the New Medievalism paradigm, with its emphasis on the diffusion of inter-governmental 
institutions and regimes, has certainly helped to better conceptualize the complexity of the post Cold 
War  order.  In  the  new  international  order  national  borders  have  been  eroded  and  a  number  of 
different practices have emerged for dealing with various issues.  However, there is no reason to 
assume that the fragmentation into regional blocs or inter-governmental networks will do away with 
the exercise of unequal power relations.  
              The New Medievalism paradigm faces many of the problems of some pluralist approaches; 
that is, it has trouble accounting for the concentration and expression of different forms of power.  
The fact that there might be many different sites does not preclude that they will not be equal, that 
some actors within the sites might be more equal than others and that the creation of this order 
might itself be the expression of the dominant position of a more powerful actor.  
               The unbundling of territory has had only disconnected effects as the power of certain states 
remains central in issues of security while diminished in finance and economic policy.  The decline 
of the state is not only different between states but also within them as well.  Some states have 
chosen to pool their capacity in certain areas – such as monetary and trade policy – in order to 
preserve  national  distinctiveness  in  other  areas.  But  none  of  regional  organizations  or  inter- 23   
governmental institutions is in the condition to challenge the US in military and political terms, 
although they contribute to construct at the global level the system of institutional constraints which 
are the functional equivalent of those operative within the US domestic structure. 
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